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With looming patent cliffs, resulting in no patent protections for several block buster
drugs, several Life sciences organizations are looking at ways to reduce the costs of
drug discovery. They are looking to change business models from having all drug
discovery activities being done in-house to a more economical collaborative
innovation model by forming ecosystems through consortiums and alliances with
several other partners to collaborate especially in the pre-competitive areas of drug
discovery. They are considering leveraging cloud computing platforms to create the
collaborative drug discovery platforms needed to support these new drug discovery
models. Another area of focus is to improve the success rate of drug discovery by
creating more complex computer models and performing more data intensive
simulations. Next generation sequence sequencers are also providing unprecedented
amounts of data to work with. Cloud computing has proven to be scalable and
capable of meeting the computation needs in life sciences domain but a key
inhibitor has been security concerns. This paper is an extension of an earlier paper
we had written that describes how to leverage a public cloud to build a scalable
genome sequence search platform to enable secure collaboration among multiple
partners. This paper describes a few additional techniques and open source solutions
that can be leveraged to address security concerns while leveraging public cloud
platforms for collaborative drug discovery activities.
Keywords: Genome sequence search, BLAST, Ensembl, Cloud security, Encryption,
Federated identity, SAML, OpenVPN, ACL, Hadoop, Hadoop securityIntroduction
Several block buster drugs will go off patent protection by 2015 [1]. This means several
life sciences companies will have cost pressures and so will be looking at ways to re-
duce costs. Current drug discovery business models involve significant redundancies
among the various life sciences organizations. They all duplicate effort is the early
stages of drug discovery which are considered pre-competitive and non-differentiating.
With the increasing cost pressures, several life sciences organizations have come to-
gether through industry alliances like Pistoia Alliance [2] to look at ways to increase
collaboration among the various players, in the pre-competitive areas of drug discovery
to reduce costs. As part of one such initiative, the members of the Pistoia Alliance [2]2012 Saxena et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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vice. Ensembl [3] is chosen as one of the relevant public sequence services to be made
available as a secure service that can be used by multiple life sciences organizations in-
stead of duplicating the efforts in deploying it in-house, maintaining it and keeping it
in sync with the constant new releases. Ensembl is a joint project between EMBL-EBI
and the Sanger Centre. Ensembl produces genome databases for vertebrates and other
eukaryotic species and makes them available for free on over the internet and also
enables search leveraging BLAST [4] algorithm. Though Ensembl is available for free
over the internet, several life sciences organizations are not able to use it because of se-
curity concerns. Ensembl doesn’t currently offer adequate security for the search opera-
tions so there are concerns about competitors could eavesdrop on the sequence
searches being performed by an organization’s scientists and use that to infer several
confidential and proprietary information. Another challenge with use of Ensembl is lack
of SLAs around performance and support. The response times are not predictable and
depend on the number of users currently performing searches and the complexity of
the search operations they are performing. This can result in scientists wasting their
precious time. As a result most life sciences organizations resort to hosting the
Ensembl applications and the datasets in-house but that results in increased costs as
each organization has to invest separately on the infrastructure and people needed to
keep it operational. This problem is not jus with Ensembl, there are several other such
popular life sciences applications and datasets that are available in public domain but
there are hosted and managed internally by most organizations resulting in redundan-
cies. Pistoia Alliance members therefore wanted a solution that offers a shared platform
that is secure and offers several such applications that are used in the pre-competitive
activities of drug discovery on-demand with predictable SLAs. They wanted to evaluate
public cloud platforms for this with Ensembl as the pilot application to be hosted and
made available on-demand with adequate security. Infosys is one amongst the IT ven-
dors that have been invited to implement a proof of concept for developing a secured
sequence search solution. This paper and the one we published earlier [5] are based on
our experiences in implementing the proof of concept.
Our earlier paper [6] explained how to implement a Secure Next Generation Se-
quence Services business cloud platform that is highly scalable and can be shared by
multiple life sciences companies securely. The earlier paper described a few techniques
for securing web applications and data hosted on a public cloud such as Amazon AWS
leveraging open source security components and how they have been leveraged to se-
cure the Ensembl solution. In this paper we expand on the earlier paper and describe a
few additional security solutions and best practices that can be leveraged in offering a
secure life sciences business cloud platform.Background and related works
Life sciences organizations have been forming several alliances and consortiums to en-
able collaboration in the pre-competitive areas of drug discovery. The Pistoia Alliance
(www.pistoiaalliance.org), Open Source Drug Discovery (www.osdd.net) , the European
Bioinformatics Institute (EBI) Industry Program, the Predictive Safety Testing Consor-
tium, Sage Bionetworks, Innovative Medicines Initiative (http://www.imi.europa.eu) are
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ation Sequencing Business Cloud Platform [7], the authors describe how to address the
scalability of a Next Generation Sequencing solution and a strategy to port a pre-
configured Sequence Search application such as BLAST [4] onto a scalable storage and
processing framework like Hadoop framework to address scalability and performance
concerns. Our previous paper [5] was an extension to the same and focused on several
security aspects of such business cloud architecture. It gave an overview of Amazon
AWS Cloud, what cloud security is about and a few open source security products like
OpenAM, Truecrypt etc and then described how to implement firewalls in AWS cloud
and techniques to address security of data at rest and in transit and how to implement
Federated Identity and form Circle-Of-trusts to enable collaboration using OpenAM
and WS-Federation Standards. This paper is an extension to previous papers [5,7] so,
the authors assume that the reader has gone through those to get the understanding of
the context, the solution overview and the solution components used.
In this paper we describe a few additional techniques that address a few more secur-
ity aspects of business cloud architecture. This paper aims at achieving the following:
1. Describe how to secure a Hadoop Cluster to prevent impersonation and
unauthorized access.
2. Provide controlled access to data residing in Hadoop Cluster through Access
Controlled Lists (ACLs).
3. Demonstrate how to implement a virtual private cloud with secured access to the
machines on a public cloud through virtual private networks (VPNs).Introduction to hadoop and security concerns
Hadoop is a java based open source framework that supports data intensive distributed
applications. Hadoop provides a highly scalable and fault tolerant distributed data stor-
age and processing framework. It is designed to scale up from single server to a cluster
containing thousands of servers, leveraging the compute and storage capabilities of the
individual servers. Hadoop is used to store the genome databases and to implement a
parallelized BLAST search. The reasons why Hadoop was chosen for this PoC were:
1. It is free and open source.
2. Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS) offer a highly scalable storage solution
that has been proven to scale to petabytes of data. So, it can be used to store the
genome data.
3. HDFS besides being scalable also offers fault tolerance by replicating data across
multiple machines there by addressing availability and reliability concerns.
4. Hadoop Map Reduce framework offers a highly scalable distributed processing
solution that leverages several commodity servers to parallelize processing. It is
therefore offer a good solution to parallelize BLAST search.
Another paper [7] describes how BLAST search has been parallelized using Hadoop.
The following are a few concerns with respect to security with the default Hadoop
settings and configuration options:
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its own. Hence a malicious user can easily impersonate as the superuser or any
valid user of Hadoop Cluster and can access the HDFS cluster from any machine.
2. Default permissions in HDFS file system: The default permissions on HDFS file
system are -rw-r–r– for files and drwxr-xr-x for directories. This gives sufficient
privileges to users to view other users’ files and directories. In some case such as
a shared infrastructure between competitors, this may not be desired.
3. Direct Access to Data Blocks: DataNodes do not enforce any access control on
access made to the data blocks they are storing by default. This allows an
unauthorized user to read a data block by supplying the blockid. This also allows
an unauthorized user to write arbitrary data to data blocks on the DataNodes.Introduction to openVPN
OpenVPN is an open source solution that enables the implementation of virtual private
network (VPN) for creating secure point-to-point connections in routed or bridged
configurations for secured access to remote machines. It makes use of a custom secur-
ity protocol that employs SSL/TLS protocol suite for key exchange and is capable of
traversing firewalls and network address translators. It supports authentication amongst
peers by means of a pre-shared secret certificates, key, or userid/password. When used
in a multi client–server scenario, it allows server to issue an authentication certificate
for each client. It utilizes OpenSSL encryption library and SSLv3/TLSv1 protocol suite,
to provide multiple features pertaining to security and control.Introduction to Access Control List(ACL)-based security model
In an ACL based-security model, ACLs are defined and enforced to control the access
of subjects to objects. The term subject can refer to a real user, system process or dae-
mon while the term object can refer to the resource(s) that a subject tries to access
such as files, directories, system ports etc. When a subject requests an operational ac-
cess on an object, the Access Control Manager (ACM) checks the ACL data for a
matching ACL to decide whether the requested operation is permitted or not.
Given this background of Amazon AWS Cloud, OpenAM, Truecrypt, Hadoop Secur-
ity, ACL-based security Model and OpenVPN we describe the security techniques in
the next section.Solution approach
In this section we describe how to implement a secure collaboration platform using a
public cloud (Amazon AWS Cloud) and then describe how to migrate a popular gen-
ome sequence search application called Basic Local Alignment Search Tool (BLAST)
and provide web based secure access to collaborating groups of life sciences
organizations.Next generation secure sequence search business cloud platform – solution design
A high level conceptual view of the Next Gen Business Cloud Platform is show below
(Figure 1).
Figure 1 Life Scinces Business Cloud Platform – Conceptual View. The figure provides a conceptual
view of a life sciences business cloud platform.
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provides scalable compute and storage capabilities. Over that is a Life Sciences Services
platform which provides domain specific services like sequence search, distributed
annotations management etc with API based on standards. The next layer is domain
specific applications supporting business processes like target management, genomics,
clinical trial management, drug sales etc in the various business areas like drug discov-
ery, development and marketing.
A prototype of a scalable elastic, pay-per-use genome sequence search platform based
on BLAST algorithm over public genome datasets with a web based genome browser
application on Amazon public cloud infrastructure is developed to validate the concept.
Hadoop was chosen as a scalable processing framework and BLAST processing was
parallelized which was described in our earlier paper [7]. Ensembl is a popular genome
sequence search application and it was used for the prototype. Our earlier paper [5]
describes several security concerns with using public cloud infrastructure and some of
the techniques we used to address those concerns.
The figure below shows various security layers of the “Next Generation Secure Se-
quencing Business Cloud Platform” solution:
To address concerns with network intrusions, a network firewall is used. To ensure
security of data in transit while using web interfaces, Secure Socket Layer (SSL)
based solution is used. Federated Identity solution based on OpenAM is used to pro-
vide Single-SignOn and enable creation of CirclesOfTrust for collaborations
(Figure 2).
The components in red color have been described in our previous paper [5]. The
components in blue color are the additions that will be described below.
The following components have been added to the Solution Design:
1. Virtual Private Network (VPN): A Virtual Private Network provides secure access
to instances on Amazon AWS Cloud especially for scenarios where they are
accessed through mechanisms that not based on HTTP. A secured direct access
may be needed for the desktop based applications trying to acccess the services or
data residing on Hadoop Cluster in the Amazon Cloud. Additionally, while
uploading private data to Hadoop Cluster, one may again need a secured access
to Hadoop Cluster. Also for maintainence, troubleshooting or upgradation
Figure 2 Next Generation Secure Sequence Search Business Cloud Platform – Security Solution
Design Diagram. The figure describes various components of the Security solution design implemented
for the solution. The components in grey have already been covered in original paper [5] while the colored
components have been discussed in this chapter.
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achieving security of data in transit
2. Secured Hadoop Cluster: Hadoop Cluster is used to store the genome data so,
there is a need protect the data from unauthorized access from malacious users.
This is required to take care of Hadoop related security issues such as
impersonation (section II.A.1), unrestrictive file permissions on HDFS (section II.
A.2) and direct access to data blocks (section II.A.3).
3. Access Control Lists(ACLs): ACLs add another level of security for data at rest
from unauthorized access (section II.C)
The subsequent sections explain the deployment architecture and implementation of
various components described above.
Next generation secure sequence search business cloud platform – deployment
architecture
The figure below gives an overview of the deployment architecture of the solution
(Figure 3):
Each Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) node provisioned has equivalent of
7.5 GB of memory, 4 EC2 Compute Units (2 virtual cores with 2 EC2 Compute Units
each), 850 GB of local instance storage, 64-bit platform.
Figure 3 Deployment Architecture for Next Generation Secure Sequence Search Business Cloud
Platform. The figure describes the deployment architecture for the solution.
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1. Web Clusters: The VM has Apache web server and is load-balanced through the
Amazon ELB.
2. Federation Server: This node runs OpenAM server deployed over Apache
Tomcat. This machine additionally runs an OpenDS LDAP server which serves as
OpenAM user store.
3. Hadoop Cluster: The cluster contains a master node and two datanodes.Securing hadoop cluster
In order to address security issues with Hadoop default settings described earlier, the
following security measures were implemented.
Impersonation
Prior to version 0.20, Hadoop had no in-built implementation of any authentication
mechanism. It trusted the underlying operating system for user’s authentication and
used `whoami` utility to identify users , and `bash –c groups` for groups. This was the
weakest link with respect to security as one can write his/her own whoami script or
groups script and add it in his/her path to impersonate someone else including super
user. This is a major threat.From version 0.20 onwards Hadoop supports Kerberos
protocol for authentication as a security measure against impersonation. The complete
step by step procedure for securing a Hadoop Cluster is described in Cloudera Security
Guide [6].
Additionally, Single Sign-On (SSO) can be used to avoid manual ticket generation.
The user can obtain his Kerberos ticket while logging in into the system. This reduces
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For ease in management of user credentials, integration of Identity Provider and Ker-
beros authentication system is recommended. This can be done by two ways:
a) One can run a Kerberos KDC and a realm local to the cluster, create all service
principals in this realm and then set up one-way cross-realm trust from this
realm to the Active Directory realm. If this approach is used, there is no need to
create any additional service principals in Active Directory and Active Directory
principals (users) can be authenticated against Hadoop.
b) Alternatively, one can use Active Directory as the Kerberos KDC, create all
service principals in the Active Directory itself and configure Hadoop/Linux
machines as Kerberos clients to use Active Directory directly.
Cloudera provides an exhaustive doumentation [8] for both the approaches.
We used approach two because of the following reasons:
1. It is easy to configure.
2. There is no overhead of maintaining master and slaves KDC (as compared to
approach 1).
3. Maintenance of user accounts becomes quite easier.
The step by step documentation for integration of Active Directory and Hadoop Se-
curity using Approach 2 is already provided by cloudera [8]. The documentation does
not cover the procedure to import Active Directory UPNs to Linux Box This can be
done by:
1. Using Samba and Winbind : Ubuntu wiki provides a complete documentation [9]
for the same.
2. Using LDAP: There is a blog [10] by Scott Lowe which describes the steps.
The work flow for Kerberos integrated security mechanism is shown below
(Figure 4):Figure 4 Workflow for Kerberos enabled Hadoop Cluster. The figure decribes the step by step
procedure for authentication in a Kerberos enabled Hadoop Cluster.
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login. The authentication process occurs in three steps:
1) User tries to authenticate to the machine by supplying his/her credentials.
2) The machine contacts the Kerberos KDC (in our case the Active Directory server
of the organization) for verification of credentials.
3) The KDC verifies the credentials and issues a Kerberos ticket to the user.
The user with the Kerberos ticket granted by the Kerberos KDC can access Hadoop
services till his Kerberos ticket is valid.
For restrictive permissions on hdfs file system
The default permissions on HDFS file system are -rw-r–r– for files and drwxr-xr-x for
directories. This gives sufficient privileges to users to view other users’ files and direc-
tories. In some case such as a shared infrastructure between competitors, this may not
be desired. To check this, the property dfs.umaskmode nedds to be added to hdfs-site.
xml file. The value is to be set as per your requirements, for our case we set it as 700
which imparts -rw-———— permissions for files and drwx--—— permissions for direc-
tories (Table 1).
For controlling direct access to data blocks
For controlling direct access to data blocks, the following properties need to be added
to hdfs-site.xml file (Table 2).
Implementation of a Virtual Private Cloud using OpenVPN
Another key requirement for the Proof of Concept (PoC) was to provide a secured re-
mote access mechanism to the machines on the Amazon AWS Cloud including the
Hadoop Cluster which contains public as well as company specific confidential private
data from the client organization’s data centers and their own private clouds. To ensure
secured access to the Amazon instances, a VPN tunnel was created between the client
machines and the Amazon instance. The workflow diagram for the implementation is
shown below (Figure 5):
The process involves the following steps:
1) The user authenticates to the VPN access gateway using web interface or
OpenVPN Connect Client.
2) The request reaches the OpenVPN Access Server.
3) The OpenVPN server queries the authentication source (ADFS Server).
4) On successful authentication, a VPN tunnel is created between the infrastructure
on Amazon Cloud and the User’s machine thus creating a Virtual Private Cloud.Table 1 Properties to restirict permissions on HDFS filesystem
Property Value to be set Description
dfs.umaskmode <depends on requirements> umask value for HDFS file system
The table contains list of properties to restrict permissions of files and directories on HDFS file system.
Table 2 Properties to control direct acess to data blocks
Property Value to be set Description
dfs.block.access.token.enable true If "true", access tokens are used
as capabilities for accessing datanodes.
If "false", no access tokens are checked
on accessing datanodes.
dfs.block.access.key. update.interval Depends upon your
requirement,
default is 600
Interval in minutes at which
namenode updates its access keys.
dfs.block.access.token.lifetime Depends upon your
requirement,
default is 600
The lifetime of access tokens
in minutes.
The table contains a list of properties required to check direct access to data blocks.
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work Layer) of OSI model. The table below describes the pros and cons of both the im-
plementation methods (Table 3):
In our solution VPN at OSI Layer 3 was implemented because:
1. It is more efficient and scalable
2. Provides better control over IP and routing configuration
3. Provides more granular control
4. Supported on all platforms such as Windows, Mac and Linux.Implementation of ACLs-based Security Model
In an ACL-based security model, lists of permissions termed as ACLs are enforced to
control access of subjects over Objects. In an ACL-based security model there are three
key players:
1. Subject: The term subject refers to a real user, system process or daemon.
2. Object: The term object in an ACL based security model refers to the resource(s)
that a subject tries to access.
3. ACL Server: This is the server which contains the list of permissions that controls
the access of a subject over an object.
The purpose of using this model in our PoC was to ensure that a user is able to ac-
cess only the data that he/she is authorized to access. Thus, limiting a user to use only
the public data and only that part of his/her organization’s private data that he/she is
authorized to access.
The key principles of this security model were:
1) The enforcement of ACLs was de-centralized so that there are multiple checks
across various layers.
2) The decision logic of ACLs was centralized: The ACL data resided on a
centralized ACL server that determines whether the user is authorized to access
the selected data or not.
The key functional requirements related to merging public and private data and pro-
viding access control were
Figure 5 Formation of VPN Tunnel. The figure describes step by step procedure for formation of VPN
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company specific private data stores that he/she is authorized to view, in order to
find matching genomes
2) Present matching genome sequences with ranking that is combined across the
public and private data stores
3) Enable providing company specific aliases to genome IDs so that it is easier to
cross-link the genome annotations and information available in public domain
with the confidential information available for the same genome but with a
company specific internal ID.ble 3 Pros and cons of implementations of VPN over various topologies
opology Pros Cons
I Layer 2 • Most appropriate for smaller networks. • Because LAN broadcasts are
propagated to all VPN clients,
this topology doesn't scale well
to LANs that have a larger amount
of broadcast traffic.
• Easy to configure.
• VPN clients receive their network • Doesn't scale well with larger
numbers of concurrent VPN clients.• properties from the same DHCP
server as machines that are • Can only be used when the
Access Server is connected to a
LAN that provides DHCP services.• physically connected to
the server-side LAN.
• Works well with application-layer • Should only be used when the
Access Server has a fixed IP address
on a private LAN.• protocols that depend on
LAN broadcast resolution.
• Can tunnel non-IP protocols. • Currently only works with
Windows Clients
I Layer 3 • More efficient and scalable. • More complex to configure.
• Greater control over IP and
routing configuration.
• Doesn't work well with application-
layer protocols that depend on
broadcast resolution.
• Better fine-grained access control.
• Works on all client platforms
that support OpenVPN.
e table provides a comparison between the implementation of VPN over Data Link layer and Network layer of OSI
odel.
Figure 6 Linking private datasets with public datasets. The figure shows successful implementation of ACLs over the datasets to ensure that a user can only access the public data or the data
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1) Access control enforcement was first done at the UI layer by enabling selection of
only relevant genome data stores.
2) Next, there was again access control enforcement in the processing layer during
the execution of the BLAST search to restrict search to only those data stores
that the user is authorized to view. This is to ensure that if the processing layer is
reached through any other channel, access controls are still enforced.
3) An Aliasing service was implemented that maintained a map of public gene IDs
from National Center for Biotechnology Institute(NCBI) with those internal to
each organization. The organization specific aliases that the user is entitled to
shown in the search result along with the NCBI IDs for the public genome data
as shown in the screenshot below (Figure 6).
Conclusion
The experience report along with the earlier reports [5,7] described how to use open
source tools and solutions to create a secure drug discovery collaboration platform in a
public cloud which provides several features like protection against possible Denial of
Service attacks, security of data in transit, security of data at rest, implementation of
Federated Identity and creation of secure Circle-Of-Trusts for collaboration,
parallelization of processing using Hadoop and securing data stored in Hadoop, enab-
ling secured access to Amazon AWS instances through VPNs, correlating public and
private data sets and providing access controls. We believe our work can be leveraged
by practitioners and researchers in life sciences domain who plan to use public clouds.
Our study, addressing a few security aspects through PoCs.These are first steps in
building a foundational business cloud platform for collaborative drug discovery. In this
experience report, we have described solutions for securing data stored in Hadoop, en-
abling secure access of genome data and services through non-HTTP channels also le-
veraging VPNs, enabling security of private genome data through application specific
access control components. In future we look forward to expansion of this work to ad-
dress other public clouds, addressing more cloud security vulnerabilities and enabling
more drug discovery related applications on to the foundational platform and expand-
ing the platform with additional layers of capabilities like high performance computing,
collaborative workflows, social collaboration workspaces and addressing the security
aspects of those components.
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